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Abstract: The future of the information society crucially depends on investments in 
upgrading existing infrastructures and building new networks. Traditional cost-based 
regulation, which focuses on issues of static efficiency and service-based competition 
necessarily has negative effects on innovation incentives and the emergence of 
infrastructure-based competition in the highly dynamic telecommunications industry. This 
paper presents a regulatory framework for new infrastructures, which makes ex ante 
regulation contingent to the tendency towards effective competitive structures. Unlike the 
standard Significant Market Power-test (SMP), this approach takes a longer term 
perspective and therefore secures operators' investment incentives. The proposal has 
several desirable incentive effects. Firstly, it counters incentives to free-ride on 
investments by potential competitors, and secondly, it makes preemptive and other 
predatory practices by the investing firm less attractive. As a result, our proposal of 
contingent regulation in emerging markets promotes infrastructure-based competition in 
telecommunications. 
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n recent decades telecommunications markets have changed 
dramatically. Only twenty years ago telecommunications industries were 
characterized by large (often state-owned) monopolists. While there was 
little variety and technological progress in those days, consumers were 
happy to obtain access, even at high costs. 
                     
(*) This paper is based on an in-depth study by the authors (see BAAKE, KAMECKE & WEY, 
2005). 
I
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In the 1980s and 1990s many countries started to privatise and liberalize 
their telecommunications markets, and by the second half of 1990 the 
development of competitive structures in traditional fixed-line telephony was 
encouraged by new laws and the installation of national regulatory 
authorities. 
At the same time, progress in information and communications 
technologies has transformed business models in the telecommunications 
industry substantially. Most importantly, new infrastructures and the 
convergence towards so-called next generation networks (NGNs) has 
enabled ubiquitous access to telecommunication and internet services. 
Higher bandwidth capacity enables operators to offer new bundles (double-
or triple-play) and should blur the traditional market boundaries between 
fixed and mobile networks. 
Besides such fundamental changes, telecommunications markets remain 
subject to strong ex ante regulations, which were designed to prevent 
incumbent monopolists from abusing their dominant positions and to ensure 
the efficient use of legacy networks. Asymmetric regulation has been used 
as a commitment to attract entrants by providing access to the incumbent's 
essential facilities and interconnection with the existing network. More 
recently, unbundling policies have been implemented to give entrants 
access to the incumbent's local copper lines. With this, additional incentives 
for entrants to build into their own complementary infrastructures have been 
created. While unbundling of the copper line can be seen as an attempt to 
provide a level playing field, where the incumbent is deprived from its 
essential facility advantage, a more restrictive type of regulation – for 
example, bitstream access – appears to be more problematic. As bitstream 
access requires the incumbent to provide a DSL access service to other 
operators, incentives to undertake infrastructure investments in the first 
place can be hurt significantly. 
With the emergence of new networks and infrastructures, regulators' face 
many difficult challenges, such as, for example, whether or not to regulate 
access and interconnection and how to promote efficient competition, and it 
is often difficult, if not impossible, to strike a balance between promoting 
static efficiency and dynamic efficiency considerations. 
In this paper we will characterize a regulatory procedure for new 
networks and infrastructures leading to potentially new markets. Our 
approach incorporates insights into the theory of dynamic competition. 
Usually, the creation of a new market does not call for active regulation. An 
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initial investment creates a new monopolistic market, the rents realized by 
the innovator attract imitators, and the resulting catch-up competition brings 
the market back to static efficiency. However, if the new market emerges in 
an environment where active regulation tries to improve static efficiency it is 
natural to ask how the regulator should behave when a new market 
emerges. We argue as follows: 
• Established markets should not pose serious obstacles to new 
developments, neither in the form of monopolistic profits, which an 
incumbent might be afraid of loosing in the case of a successful innovation, 
nor in the form of limited access to legacy network elements. If competition 
does not provide such a level-playing field, it has to be created by the 
regulatory authority. This implies that access to legacy network elements 
should be guaranteed at cost based tariffs (for example, unbundled access 
to the local loop). 
• After a significant investment has established new networks and 
infrastructures, tests should be conducted to determine whether a new 
market has indeed been created. If this is not the case, then the market 
should be treated as the already existing "old" market. 
• Regulatory agencies are usually not good at evaluating ongoing 
economic developments. To provide sufficient market-based incentives for 
infrastructure investments and commercial innovations, new markets should 
therefore not be subject to ex ante regulation for a few years. 
• In a newly created market the regulatory authority should check 
regularly (approximately every two years) whether effective competitive 
structures are emerging. If this is not the case – meaning that persistent 
market dominance will prevail in the future –, then the new market should 
come under sector-specific regulation. If, however, effective competition 
evolves, the market should be governed by general competition rules in an 
ex post manner. 
As we will argue in this paper, this procedure takes care of several trade-
offs and incentive problems present in telecommunications markets. 
The following section of the paper summarizes the open questions raised 
by the new regulatory environment in the EU and focuses on the concept of 
new and emerging markets. Then we provide a short summary of the 
insights gained from the economic theory of innovation and the particular 
investment problems in the telecommunications business. Based on our 
analysis of dynamic competition in telecommunications, the section after 
lays out a regulatory framework for dealing with new and emerging markets. 
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  The new regulatory framework in the European Union 
The question of how to react to the rapidly changing technological 
environment in telecommunications, and accordingly whether and how to 
phase out regulatory supervision, has gained new momentum with the 
implementation of the new regulatory framework in the EU 1. The new 
regulatory framework accounts for the rapid pace of technological progress 
by providing a uniform legal framework that covers the convergence of 
telecommunications, media and information technologies (see EU 
Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, Recital 5). Moreover, it aims at bringing 
the regulation of electronic markets into line with the principles of European 
competition law 2. 
A critical aspect of the new framework is that telecommunications 
markets are no longer lumped together under the supervision of the 
regulatory authority. Instead, specified criteria must first to be applied to 
define markets, which may become candidates for ex ante regulation in a 
further procedural step. Accordingly, the European Commission's 
Recommendation on relevant product and service markets (C(2003) 497) 
requires identification of those markets that cannot be expected to generate 
effective competition and should, therefore, come under some sort of sector-
specific regulation 3. 
The recommendation specifies three criteria, which must all be satisfied 
before a certain market can be included in the list: 
                     
1 The new regulatory framework mainly consists of EU Directives 2002/19/EC to 2002/21/EC: 
Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (OJ L 108 of April 24th 2002, p. 33), also known as the "Framework 
Directive"; Directive 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks 
and services (OJ L 108 of April 24th 2002, p. 21), known as the "Authorisation Directive"; and 
Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks 
and associated facilities (OJ L 108 of April 24th 2002, p. 7), known as the "Access Directive". 
The new legal framework also includes two further Directives, the so-called "Universal Service 
Directive" and the "Data Protection Directive"; however, the latter are of subordinate importance 
to our study. 
2 See "Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market 
power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and 
services" (2002/C 165/03) published in the Official Journal of the European Communities C 
165/6, July 11th 2002. 
3 See "Commission Recommendation of February 11th 2003 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services" 
(2003/311/EC), published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 114/45, May 8th 2003. 
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- "high and non-transitory" structural or legal barriers to entry; 
- no tendency towards effective competition within a certain time 
horizon; 
- market failure cannot be addressed by competition law alone. 
It is worth noting that the recommendation explicitly refers to the dynamic 
character of markets and requires an assessment of their tendency towards 
competition 4. The recommendation also specifies a list of markets that are 
most likely not to develop towards effective competition. 
In view of the highly dynamic technological environment of the 
telecommunications industry, an important issue determining the 
effectiveness of the new legal framework is the adjustment of the list of 
relevant markets over time and the associated problem of how new markets 
should be treated. Recital 15 to the recommendation on relevant product 
and service markets states: 
"Furthermore, new and emerging markets, in which market power may 
be found to exist because of ‘first-mover' advantages, should not in 
principle be subject to ex-ante regulation". 
The protection of "first-mover" advantages as a reason to exclude new 
markets from the list of relevant product and service markets is closely 
related to the objective of the framework directive to encourage "efficient 
investment in infrastructure, and promoting innovation" (see Art. 8 (2c) of the 
framework directive) 5. 
The concept of "new and emerging markets" introduced by the new 
regulatory framework explicitly recognizes the need to guarantee "first-
mover" advantages so as to protect innovation incentives, and hence, the 
development of new infrastructures. While this approach intends to rule out 
any ex ante regulation for new markets, there is still ample scope for 
discretion. Moreover, a coherent regulatory framework is still missing, which 
makes the concepts of a "new market" and "tendency to effective 
competition" operational. It also remains open as to what degree of "first-
                     
4 Referring to Germany, the Telekommunikationsgesetz (TKG) amended in 2003 states in a 
similar way in Article 10 that markets should only be subject to ex ante regulation where they do 
not display any longer-term tendency towards competition. 
5 A similar argument is used to explain Art. 14 (Review of market definition and analysis) of 
Germany's new TKG, p. 87, which states: "New markets are not therefore automatically subject 
to supervision by the Bundeskartellamt [the Federal Cartel Office], but should first be reviewed 
by the RegTP - in conjunction with the Bundeskartellamt - for their need for regulation under the 
TKG." 
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mover" advantage is desirable in terms of efficient investment and 
innovation. 
Answers to these open issues will be presented below. Before presenting 
a regulatory procedure we will briefly summarize some lessons from the 
theory of economic dynamics that are important for structuring an 
appropriate regulatory mechanism that takes account of the fundamental 
trade-off between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency in network-based 
industries. 
  Lessons from dynamic competition theory 
The starting point of virtually all theories of dynamic competition are the 
ideas developed by Joseph A. SCHUMPETER (1918, 1950, 1964), who 
pioneered research into the economic principles that govern technological 
change and economic development. His thoughts start with the observation 
that capitalism has led to an unusually long period of constant economic 
growth, and that economists have been unable to offer any explanations for 
this phenomenon. 
Schumpeter's thoughts provide us with three key insights into the nature 
of economic dynamics: 
Firstly, he established that investigating the economic principles 
governing economic development and technological change are of 
paramount importance for identifying the best economic systems. According 
to Schumpeter, technological progress and the creation of new markets are 
the main sources of competitiveness and general prosperity, while problems 
of static efficiency are more or less irrelevant 6. 
Secondly, Schumpeter formulated the theory of stepwise economic 
development, with small businesses exploiting their freedom within the 
competitive equilibrium to give a decisive impetus to this development. While 
                     
6 Thus SCHUMPETER writes (1950) that the reality of a capitalist economy is essentially 
different from the static price-theory model of economic theory. As a result, the most important 
form of competition is not competition within a market with established technologies, production 
processes and industry structures, but competition for new products, technologies, sources of 
supply and organizational models. 
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this will lead to "creative destruction", effective catch-up competition should 
ensure that monopolies remain a temporary phenomenon. 
Thirdly, Schumpeter also developed the counter hypothesis that 
innovations by larger and more powerful companies gain ever greater 
importance for economic development. In this scenario, small companies 
and catch-up competition would become of minor importance for economic 
development, while large firms would be the decisive forces for technological 
progress. In that case markets become increasingly concentrated and 
regulatory intervention will be inevitable in order to control permanent 
monopoly power Overall, we can extract several insights from Schumpeter's 
work on the desirable properties of dynamic competition. The development 
begins with a drastic innovation. The incentives for such innovations are 
optimal if many firms compete on a "level playing field". Even if a dominant 
firm has a natural advantage in generating the next innovation, such a level 
playing field generally does not harm investment incentives. Instead, 
innovation incentives for a (permanent) monopolist are typically too low as 
market power creates hold-up problems, X-inefficiencies and rent-seeking 
activities. If the regulatory authority protects society against permanent 
monopolization in this market phase, it therefore eliminates both static and 
dynamic inefficiencies. In the case of telecommunications this can – in 
principle – be accomplished by cost-based access regulations. Every drastic 
innovation involves some larger sunk investment. An optimal dynamic 
process must therefore reward innovators for their efforts by allowing them 
to charge more than the competitive price. This incentive is provided by a 
temporary monopoly phase, in which investors are rewarded for their risk-
taking efforts. Of course, this exploitation leads to static inefficiencies, but it 
generates incentives to undertake risky investments that are desirable from 
a dynamic perspective. 
As standard R&D theory has demonstrated, market-based innovation 
incentives are typically too low, as innovators cannot reap the entire social 
gains associated with an increase in the generally available knowledge 
coming from an innovation (see, for example, AGHION & HOWITT, 1998). 
Government intervention can influence the dynamic process through many 
different policy instruments. Patent law guarantees a state-protected 
monopoly position, and cartel laws specify the extent to which dominant 
companies can "abuse" their market power. An effective regulatory authority 
can help to ensure that markets return to a state of "symmetric" competition 
after a phase of monopolization, or even implement a competition-like 
market solution through regulation, if such a process does not start on its 
own. 
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This problem is even bigger when it comes to upgrading or building new 
infrastructure in telecommunications. Here major uncertainties concerning 
the expected revenue stream tend to be larger than in other markets, as 
investments in network infrastructure do not create any additional utility on 
the consumer side, and hence revenues. The expected return on investment 
depends more on the commercialisation of new complementary services and 
applications which make use of the improved performance of the new 
network (such as higher bandwidth). Only in cases where new services are 
introduced that function purely on the older infrastructures (for example, high 
download times) it follows that infrastructure investments pay because of an 
increased derived demand, which cannot substitute away the older 
infrastructures. In addition, network effects typically involve selling a product 
cheaply in an early market phase in order to achieve critical mass and to 
stimulate further growth in demand. There is consequently a natural conflict 
between the optimal marketing of the new product and the reward for the 
innovation effort. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that traditional cost-based access regulation 
of new infrastructures must substantially lower investment incentives, as 
access charges cannot account for the substantial ex ante uncertainties. 
Further problems arise when we take a closer look at the consequences of 
active regulation in this market phase. 
Firstly, standard cost-based access regulation grants competitors the 
risk-free option of using new networks when they have made no 
investment 7. As a result, cost-based regulation reduces the investment 
incentives of competitors 8. Secondly, as competition for investments 
generally increases investment incentives, access regulation to older 
networks is essential to provide a "level-playing filed" in this regard. Thirdly, 
the possibility of investing in infrastructure may give rise to leap-frogging 
competition, which is another source of dynamic efficiency. Fourthly, as 
there is also a motive for preempting rivals in the absence of access 
regulation (see RIORDAN, 1992), the regulatory framework should 
                     
7 Similar conclusions are reached by HAUSMAN (1997), HAUSMAN & SIDAK (1999) and 
HAZLETT & HAVENNER (2003). For new networks, the dynamic regulation of access prices 
proposed by CAVE & VOGELSANG (2003) and CAVE (2003) following the "ladder of 
investment" theory results in a one-sided distribution of risk to the detriment of the regulated 
company: progressive increases in access prices mean that competitors – who have not been 
forced to invest – have a risk-free exit option. 
8 Recent research by ALLEMAN & RAPOPPORT (forthcoming) suggests that in a dynamic 
context, this problem can be overcome by considering the exercise of the incumbent's option as 
an additional opportunity cost in the access costs. 
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"threaten" to impose standard ex ante regulation whenever no effective 
competition emerges. This may counter the preemptive motive, and hence, 
further promotes the emergence of effective competitive structures. 
Overall, cost-based regulation of entry not only aggravates the 
appropriability problem, but also runs counter to the objective of achieving 
infrastructure-based competition in telecommunications markets. As we 
have argued in this section, such a regulatory philosophy neither takes 
accounts for investment risks nor does it cover the incentives for "leap-
frogging" competition, and hence, the dynamics of infrastructure based 
competition. 
  Contingent ex ante regulation of new markets  
We have seen that immediate cost-based access regulation cannot be 
optimal in new and emerging markets. Below we outline a regulatory 
framework for new markets, which takes account of investment incentives 
and the promotion of infrastructure-based competition. 
Several departures from the existing regulatory philosophy are necessary 
to achieve this goal. Most importantly, new markets should only become 
subject to ex ante price or access regulation whenever there is no tendency 
to effective competition. In terms of market tests and market analysis, this 
implies that regulation should not be based solely on the standard SMP-test 
or a similar short-term test of effective competition 9, but on a tendency test 
which examines whether effective competition is likely to develop over some 
time. 
Although it is generally extremely difficult to give a precise definition of a 
new market, we may take as a necessary condition for a new market the 
existence of an innovation, i.e. an increase in general knowledge of the 
possibilities of manufacturing or distributing goods or services. The 
innovation does not necessarily have to be backed up by a patent or other 
protected rights; the essential feature is that the innovation should have a 
"certain significance", so that new services and applications can be 
envisioned for the improved infrastructure. 
                     
9 The SMP test is used to establish whether one or more companies hold significant market 
power. 
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Figure 6 - Regulation of new markets 
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Figure 1 depicts the contingent regulatory approach for new markets. 
Like the "access holiday" proposal by GANS & KING (2003), the framework 
grants an unconditional access holiday in, say, the first four years to allow 
the new market to develop. After four years a modified SSNIP test 10 is 
applied to examine whether the needs satisfied in the new market were also 
adequately satisfied before. This means looking at an "old" market, in which 
the needs in question were satisfied at a certain time (for example four 
years) ago, and answering the question taken from the SSNIP test: What 
percentage of consumers in the new market would revert to the products of 
the old market if the prices of the products available four years ago fell in 
real terms (i.e. adjusted for inflation) by 20% (= 4x 5%)? In a new market, 
this value should be small, and we can surely talk of a new market if less 
than 20% of customers would revert to the old products 11. On the other 
hand, if over 80% of customers would revert to the old products in the event 
of such a price decrease, we can be quite sure that no new market has 
                     
10 The SSNIP test measures the change in demand caused by a "small but significant and non-
temporary increase in price". It is generally used to capture the price-elasticity of demand. 
11 This will also apply where relatively close substitutes have been developed for the new 
market. For example, alternative options for broadband access have no bearing on how many 
DSL customers would return to ISDN if the price dropped by 20%. 
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emerged. In between these extremes, the answer depends on other 
aspects, for example, market segmentation such that a considerable 
proportion of consumers would never substitute to the old product. 
If a new market has been identified, then no regulatory intervention 
occurs. Otherwise a reversion to ex post regulation according to the "old" 
market takes place. 
In subsequent years, the new market should be examined with regard to 
its tendency towards effective competition, which crucially depends on 
catch-up competition. 
Assuming that the "normal" course in an unregulated market would be 
that an innovator looses its dominant market position within, say, twelve 
years, the regulator should investigate in the period between the emergence 
of a new market and the transition to static regulation, whether effective 
competition evolves. To evaluate the tendency towards effective 
competition, the market test must not be based on the current market 
structure, but on the projected structure twelve years after the emergence of 
the new market. Consequently, using a short-run market test as the SMP 
test yields false results and should not be used to determine whether 
regulatory intervention is warranted. 
The successive tendency test can then be formulated as follows: 
• Six years after the innovation, it should be possible to observe the 
development of competing infrastructures< 
• Eight years after innovation, competitors should have gained 
significant and growing market share. This process of increasing market 
share, if sustained at the same rate for the next four years, should result in a 
market share of over 30%. 
• Ten years after innovation, the current market structure should permit 
a fairly reliable forecast of whether the next two years will see a situation in 
which regulation according to the SMP test is no longer necessary. 
If the tendency test establishes at any of these investigations that the 
tendency towards competition defined according to the relevant criteria does 
not exist, the market should become subject to the existing regulation. 
Finally, after twelve years a definitive review should be carried out to 
determine whether the market satisfies the standard SMP test. 
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We conclude with a brief examination of the incentive effects of the 
proposed framework. 
Firstly, in the first six years, in which there is no regulation of new 
markets, investments by all companies, including competitors, are protected. 
This provides market based incentives for investments by improving the 
ability to appropriate the investment rents. 
Secondly, investment incentives are increased by the fact that regulation 
will only be applied in those cases where no tendency towards competition 
has emerged; i.e., regulation is contingent on the evolving market structure. 
Assuming that viable competitors are also better off when no ex ante 
regulation occurs, their incentives to free-ride on the investing firms' 
investments becomes less likely which, in turn, stimulates competitors' 
investments. 
Thirdly, a similar argument also shows that strategies to prevent 
competition for potential market-dominant companies may actually lose 
value. If the investing firm tries to preempt rivals then it must expect to come 
under regulatory control, and hence, cost-based price and access regulation. 
Under the proposed regulatory framework the investing firm now faces the 
option of avoiding future regulation by not engaging in such anti-competitive 
practices. Hence, the threat of regulation promotes the emergence of 
effective competition by making entry-deterring practices less attractive. 
  Conclusion 
Overall, the regulatory framework for new markets should take care of 
the vertical structure (and associated complementarities between services 
and infrastructure) and the associated risks for innovating firms. A standard, 
cost-based regulatory system, which may be optimal in a static environment, 
necessarily reduces firms' investment incentives, because it does not 
properly take into account the risks the investor has to bear; or, more 
precisely, the need for high rewards in successful countries where the 
probability of ex ante is fairly low. Cost-based access regulation unfolds an 
additional negative effect on rival firms' investment incentives, and therefore, 
tends to hinder catch-up competition, which is essential for generating 
market structures in the telecommunications industry based on a dispersed 
ownership of infrastructure. 
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A regulatory system should, therefore, take into account incentives to 
develop (new) competing infrastructures in order to achieve dynamic 
efficiency. If new networks are exempted from any regulation for a certain 
period of time, this will secure potentially high profits for the first innovator. In 
addition, it also increases the investment incentives of potential competitors. 
The decisive point is consequently to determine how new markets should be 
defined. As it is not possible ex ante to predict how, for example, the 
provision of new services and applications, and hence access to new 
networks, will develop, we propose to impose restrictions on new markets 
only after four to six years after the market emerges. 
The development of the new market should then be monitored every two 
years with a view to the emergence of effective competition, and with an 
ever-increasing emphasis on structural competition. This series of 
successive development tests should concludes, after no more than twelve 
years, with the existing SMP test. If, however, there is no discernable trend 
towards significant competitive structures, the market should be subjected to 
sector-specific control at an earlier stage. 
This approach not only takes into account the risk-laden innovation 
problem of the investing company; it also generates positive incentives for 
competitors to invest into competing infrastructures. The reason for this is 
that competitors investing on their own behalf may generate effective 
competition and so avoid the need for any future regulation of the market. 
Moreover, the incentive to free-ride on innovators' investments is also 
mitigated be the overly long review process. Finally, the threat of regulation if 
no effective competition emerges, counters possible incentives for 
innovators to protect their monopoly with entry-deterring tactics. 
These incentive effects depend crucially on a strict adherence by the 
regulatory authority to the proposed regulation scheme. In order to 
implement the proposed regulatory system, it is therefore also necessary for 
the European Commission to define potentially new markets, which can then 
be subjected by the national regulatory authorities to the proposed 
development tests – and not to a short-term test of projected market power 
like the SMP test. 
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Annex – U.S. and EU Telecom Statistics 
Prepared by IDATE 
 
 
 
 
t is difficult to discuss the merits of regulatory frameworks without examining 
market dynamics and trends in industrial organisations. For this reason, we have 
selected a set of data that would reflect the characteristics of the sector on both sides 
of the Atlantic. As we can see from the figures presented, the European and U.S. 
sectors share many common features, including the falling number of analogue 
telephony subscribers and a drop in fixed telephony revenues, market growth driven 
primarily by mobiles (with a time lag that is now mainly in favour of U.S. operators), 
rapid growth in the number of broadband subscribers, fixed-mobile convergence 
strategies, etc. Even the special feature of the U.S. sector to-date, namely the 
existence of a long distance market created by decree in 1982, has disappeared with 
AT&T and MCI taken over by SBC and Verizon. Against this background, the 
question of growth and innovation is becoming crucial to operators right across the 
industry in both the USA and Europe. 
However, major disparities remain between Europe and the USA. We would like 
to highlight at least two of these differences. The first is the dominant role played by 
cable in the USA in the broadband access market. This situation led the judicial 
authorities, and subsquently the FCC, to call into question the unbundling obligations 
that applied to RBOCs, creating a trend towards heavy investment by the latter in 
deploying optical access networks and even in offering IPTV (as well as innovative 
services that are yet to be clearly defined). The second difference lies in the higher 
level of concentration in the U.S. sector versus the European Union, the largest 
single market on this side of the Atlantic. In the mobile sector specifically, 
balkanisation is not to be found in the USA, but in Europe. It remains to be seen 
whether Europe, which has seen many deals signalling national consolidation in 
recent months, is going to see a new phase of consolidation that can produce pan-
European players of a similar size to the U.S. giants SBC and Verizon. 
Yves GASSOT 
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Telecom service markets by region 
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Recent trends in subscriber bases 
(million lines or subscribers) 
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Decline of fixed telephony revenues 
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Increase of mobile service revenues 
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The world top 10 telecom operators 
(2004 revenues, billion USD) 
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RBOCs' domestic wireline revenues 
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Major european telcos' fixed revenues 
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Major european telcos' domestic wireless revenues 
(current data, billion EUR) 
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US RBOCs' EBITDA as a % of revenues 
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Major European telcos' EBITDA as a % of revenues  
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Major European mobile telcos' subscriber market share as a % of total mobile subscriber 
base in Western Europe (June 2005) 
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Major US mobile telcos' subscriber market share  
as a % of total mobile subscriber base in US 
(June 2005) 
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Market share of incumbent operators in domestic broadband operations 
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